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Abstract: This paper reviews the experience of undertaking reforms in Indonesia after the 
economic crisis 1997/98, focusing on the reforms made under the last two presidents: 
Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The review leads the paper to draw some 
lessons from the experience. Among other, the role of IMF in disciplining the policy 
direction, and hence the reforms, is quite evident. This is in the light of dramatic change 
in the political economy of decision-making process after the crisis, where the power was 
shifted from the president to the government. The paper also finds that one important 
constraint for delivering a successful reform is nationalistic ideology which strongly 
opposes the mechanism for moving towards more efficient market. Meanwhile, in 
practical terms, the change in political architecture seems to have contributed to the 
coordination problems across the governmental agencies and ministries, which leads to 






The so-called IMF-supported programs for Indonesia began with the signing of the first 
letter of intent (LOI) at the end of October 1997 and extended over a six year period until 
the termination of the last one at the end of December 2003. During this period four 
different governments were implementing the reform programs with varying successes. 
Three factors have influenced the outcome: IMF conditionality, ownership of the 
program, and capacity to implement.
2  
 
Under President Soeharto difficulties in implementing the program were apparent from 
the outset. The President was unhappy with the immediate step taken under the program 
to close 16 banks, which included a bank that was owned by one of his sons. He also 
appeared to have rapidly lost confidence in the program as the country’s economic 
conditions continued to worsen. He began to seek advice from groups other than his 
economic team and toyed with alternative ideas, such as the Currency Board System, to 
replace the IMF program. It has also been pointed out that the inclusion of a structural 
reform agenda in the program, rather than limiting it to macroeconomic stabilization and 
                                                 
2 Boediono (2002).   3
improving the health of the financial system, could have been the main reason why the 
program ran into great difficulties.
3 The conditionality included the dismantling of the 
clove monopoly and the withdrawal of governmental support for the national aircraft 
industry, IPTN, and for the Timor national car projects, all involving people who were 
very close to President Soeharto. These measures were not urgent to overcoming the 
crisis, but they were included because improving governance was seen as important to 
restoring public and market confidence in the government.  The implementation of the 
program was characterized by rapidly weakening ownership. Poor implementation was 




In May 1998 Soeharto handed the presidency to Habibie. In July a new IMF-supported 
program was agreed upon. This second agreement contained a strategy for corporate 
restructuring and a more elaborate bank restructuring program.
5 For the next year, six 
successful reviews of the program took place. The success was due to a number of 
factors, namely: the program was clearly spelled out; there was singleness of purpose at 
the top; the agreed basic strategy was insulated from the pull and push of sectional 
interests; rapid communication and candid interaction between the president and the 
economic team; bureaucratic reform; and workable relations between the government and 
the parliament and the regions (following the adoption of regional autonomy).
6 
Unfortunately, the Habibie government became entangled in a serious scandal of political 
financing (the Bank Bali scandal) to help win his election as president. The government’s 
refusal to publicize the audit on Bank Bali, as demanded by the IMF, led to a standoff 
that resulted in the suspension of the program in September 1999.    
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Bank Indonesia and later as Head of the Indonesian Planning Agency, BAPPENAS. 
5 During the six years there were three agreements with the IMF. The first was signed on 31 October 1997, 
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reviews have led to a suspension of the program, one towards the end of the Habibie government and the 
other one towards the end of the Wahid government. 
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The IMF-supported program was critical for the maintenance of a coherent economic 
agenda during a period of continued turmoil and tumultuous changes of government. An 
important aspect of the program was the measures taken to strengthen institutional 
development to promote greater transparency and competition, more institutional 
autonomy, and a stronger legal and regulatory environment. Amongst the earlier 
measures were the reforms to overhaul the bankruptcy system and the establishment of a 
commercial court. Another major initiative was the introduction of competition policy 
and the enactment of the Law regarding Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and 
Unhealthy Competition (Competition Law) in March 1999.
7  The independence of Bank 
Indonesia was established under the Central Bank Law of 1999.   
  
Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president in October 1999. A new, and third, agreement 
with the IMF was signed in January 2000 and extended the program to December 2002. 
This new program incorporated a medium-term agenda that had four components: a 
medium-term macroeconomic framework; restructuring policies; rebuilding economic 
institutions; and improving natural resources management. The macroeconomic 
framework outlined a recovery program while maintaining price stability. The 
implementation of the program was extremely slow. Wahid reshuffled his cabinet several 
times but that did not help. He also established the National Economic Council (DEN) 
and the National Council for Business Development (DPUN), but their main task was to 
give him a “second opinion.” Soon enough Wahid was also implicated in a number of 
governance problems, including the Bulog scandal that eventually led to his removal 
from office.  
 
IMF loan disbursements were delayed because of the scandals and the poor 
implementation of the program by the economic team, which was essentially opposed to 
the involvement of the IMF. During Wahid’s government there were only three 
supplementary MEFPs, and the last one was suspended in December 2000. Two main 
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problems were faced by the Wahid government in implementing the reform program.
8 
First, the program contained a long list of issues related to structural conditionality. 
Second, implementation capacity declined because of the following reasons.  There was 
no team work amongst the economic ministers and there was a growing rift between the 
government and the central bank, Bank Indonesia, which had recently gained its 
independence. The bureaucracy was sliding into a state of paralysis because of 
uncertainty about the direction of the reform process. Decentralization (regional 
autonomy) caused further complications, and the relationship between the government 
and the parliament continued to worsen. 
 
President Wahid failed to exercise economic leadership, and with a weak economic team 
in the cabinet, it was the executing agencies that held the key to the implementation of 
policies to revive the economy. In overcoming the crisis, the previous government had 
established new institutions, which included the Indonesian Banking Restructuring 
Agency (IBRA), the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA), and the Jakarta 
Initiative Task Force (JITF). Together with Bank Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance, the 
State Minister for Investment and State Enterprises, all those “crisis institutions” were 
involved in the gigantic task of credit restructuring, which was one of the most important 
tasks towards economic recovery. Coordination amongst these institutions and agencies 
was very weak and of an ad hoc nature. 
  
By the middle of 2001 relations between the president and the parliament became very 
tense. In July Wahid was removed from office and was replaced by his Vice President, 
Megawati. Megawati’s economic team moved swiftly to mend the relations with the IMF. 
In August the government produced an “extended” MEFP, which was built upon the third 
agreement (of January 2000), as the basis for renewed IMF support that was already 
suspended for eight months. In December another “extended” MEFP was issued with the 
request to the IMF to extend the program to December 2003. Over the next two years six 
“supplementary” MEFPs were issued. Although Megawati’s economic team was 
supportive of and became more pro-active in implementing the IMF programs, the 
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process was slow and difficult due to problems of implementation capacity that had 
already begun to emerge under the Wahid government. Political stability was restored 
under Megawati because her style of leadership was based on the wisdom of not rocking 
the boat. She was also given the assurance by the Chairman of the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR), the highest state body electing the president, that she would not be 
removed from office before the 2004 presidential election. 
 
From the middle of 2002 there were increased calls for the government to terminate the 
program with the IMF when it ended at the end of 2003. By then Indonesia was the only 
remaining country under the IMF from the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. The general 
session of the MPR in August 2002 formally recommended the development of a 
framework for ending Indonesia’s dependence on the IMF. This opened the debate on the 
form of engagement with the IMF after the program expired (“exit strategy”). In May 
2003, the IMF outlined three broad options for Indonesia: (a) a Standby Arrangement, 
amounting to a continuation of the program; (b) a Precautionary Standby Arrangement; 
and (c) exiting the standby framework completely but engaging in a “post program 
monitoring.” Under all of these scenarios Indonesia would paid off its debt to the IMF, 
amounting to US$ 9.2 billion, over a period of seven years. A fourth option was proposed 
by those that demanded a total break from the IMF, suggesting that Indonesia could repay 
the entire outstanding debt to the IMF using the country’s international reserves. 
 
In late July 2003 the government announced that it would not extend the IMF program. It 
formed an interagency team to formulate an exit strategy taking into consideration issues 
of “financing gap” and “credibility gap” when ending the IMF support. The former refers 
to the increased financing needs of the government, and the latter refers to the possible 
adverse impact on market sentiments. The decision to end the IMF program was 
influenced by the approaching election year, to some extent in response to the growing 
nationalist mood in politics and public discourse. In addition, the government felt that 
Indonesia’s improved macroeconomic condition was sufficiently favorable to ending the 
program.
9 On 10 December 2003 the government signed the last LOI which led to the 
                                                 
   7
release of the final trance of the third agreement with the IMF.   
 
In preparation for the ending of the IMF-supported program, on 15 September 2003 the 
government issued an Economic Policy Package Pre and Post-IMF, known as the White 
Paper. It contained Indonesia’s own economic recovery program for the rest of 2003 and 
2004. The objectives of the White Paper were: (a) to sustain and build on the 
macroeconomic stability that had been achieved; (b) to continue the restructuring and 
reforming of the financial sector; and (c) to increase investment, exports and employment 
(see Box 1). The policy package was in general well received by the public and the 
market. The part of the package that raised some skepticism was the section that 
addressed the issues of investment, exports and employment because it lacked vision, 
coherence, and credible policy measures. On the whole, the significance of the policy 
package was to help lock-in government reform policies, especially in an election year.
10 
 
The White Paper was quite wide-ranging, and in the assessment of many observers it was 
much more elaborate and ambitious than the LOIs produced under the IMF-supported 
programs. The policy package, however, was produced entirely by the Indonesian 
government with inputs from the private sector and in consultation with a group of 
independent economists. There was a greater sense of ownership that promised to 
produce stronger commitments for its implementation. It also was instrumental to 
improving coordination and cooperation between the Ministry of Finance and Bank 
Indonesia.    
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The Megawati government was rather successful in building and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability thanks to the development of institutions, ensuring the 
independence of Bank Indonesia in conducting monetary policy, as well as the 
Box 1 
Economic Policy Package Pre and Post IMF 
 
On 15 September 2003, the government issued Presidential Instruction No 5/2003 on the 
‘Economic Policy Package in Conjunction with the Completion of the Government’s Program 
with the IMF’.  
 
The main elements of this Policy Package were as follows: 
 
Maintaining macroeconomic stability 
The Target is to achieve a healthy and sustainable fiscal position and to reduce the rate of 
inflation while maintaining sufficient international reserves for medium term needs. The fiscal 
policy to achieve that target includes the following: (a) to reduce the budget deficit gradually 
to achieve a balanced position over the period 2005-2006; (b) to reduce the stock of 
government debt to GDP to a safe position; (c) to reform and modernize the national tax 
system to create reliable revenue source; (d) to increase the efficiency of government 
expenditures; and (e) to develop an effective debt management system. 
 
Restructuring and reforming the financial sector  
In view of the strategic role of the financial sector in stabilizing the economy and promoting 
recovery, the policy measures will be focused on: (a) establishing a Financial Safety  Net 
through the development of a Deposit Insurance Corporation, establishing a Lender of Last 
Resort facility at Bank Indonesia, and strengthening the financial system with the 
establishment of a Financial Services Authority; (b) continuing with the program of 
restructuring and improving the health of the banking sector, state owned, banks under IBRA 
(Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency) and others; (c) tightening the oversight of money 
laundering; (d) improving the performance of capital markets and their supervision; (e) 
consolidating the insurance and pension industries; (f) improving the performance and 
governance of state-owned enterprises; and (g) advancing the development of public 
accounting. 
 
Increasing investment, exports and employment 
It is recognized that the private sector plays an important part here and that the main task of 
the government is to create a climate conducive to the private sector through good policies and 
institutions. The key policy initiatives include: (a) improving investment policy and trade 
through One-Roof Service, and a National Investment and Export Team to assess inter-
sectoral problems; (b) increasing legal certainty by revising the Bankruptcy Law, and bringing 
regional regulations into line with higher regulations o r the public good; (c) building and 
rehabilitating infrastructure to assure services in electricity, transportation, 
telecommunications, and water resources; (d) increasing the transparency of public services; 
and (e) improving equity through programs to eradicate poverty and job creation.   9
reorganization of the Ministry of Finance (under the 2003 law on government finance) to 
ensure fiscal prudence.  
 
With the ending of the IMF-supported program, Indonesia agreed to a Post Program 
Monitoring, called Post Program Dialogue, with the IMF.
11 This involves two monitoring 
visits a year by an IMF team to review progress towards achieving the set of reforms and 
targets formulated by Indonesia, as articulated in the White Paper for 2004. This is in 
addition to two other IMF staff visits a year, one of which is the regular Article IV 
consultation. The consortium of donors, CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia), also 
acts as a kind of watchdog. In late 2003 it set up a CGI Working Group on Investment to 
focus on measures to improve Indonesia’s investment climate.  
    
Of significance were the emerging home-grown efforts to monitor the implementation of 
the reform programs. The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kadin Indonesia) 
established an independent monitoring team. It invited the participation of the Jakarta 
Japan Club Foundation (the organization of Japanese investors in Indonesia), Amcham 
Indonesia (the American Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia), the International Business 
Chamber, and a number of independent economists. In the first Press Statement of 
November 2003 the independent monitoring team laid down key policy areas that were 
given highest priority by the private sector. These included improving the investment 
climate and the overall business climate, to which legal reform was seen as critical, 
reform of the tax administration, reform of customs administration, careful drafting of 
implementing regulations of a new Manpower Law, and various measures to improve 
infrastructure (energy, electricity, telecommunications and transportation).   
    
The “monitoring” team became a misnomer as the team decided on a mode of operation 
that did not monitor progress on the implementation of the program and issue regular 
monitoring reports. Instead it offered to work with the government to assist in the 
successful implementation of the programs by working directly with the respective 
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government agencies by providing inputs in the formulation of regulations and policy 
measures. The team established several subgroups, such as on taxation, customs, 
investment, and labor, that interact with their government counterparts. It was the 
government itself that produced regular reports on the progress of implementing the 
White Paper. However, it was difficult for the public to assess whether the issuance of 
regulations and reform policies was indeed translated into actions and changes on the 
ground. Overall it can be concluded that the government was successful in maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. Improvements in the financial sector had mixed results. Credit 
growth remained sluggish, but this could partly be explained by the continued difficulties 
in the real sector and failure to improve the investment climate. In 2004 much of the 
attention was diverted to the April general elections and the two rounds of direct 
presidential elections.  
 
Kadin Indonesia, on the basis of the “monitoring” exercises, sought to produce a set of 
recommendations that it could present to the elected president. It set up a task force to 
draft the recommendation. An early version was presented to President-elect Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, but the final report, “Revitalization of the Industry and 
Investment” was formally submitted in October 2004 to the new President.  
 
In forming his cabinet, President SBY chose a businessman, Aburizal Bakrie, who was 
also the immediate past Chair of Kadin Indonesia, to be the Coordinating Minister for 
Economic Affairs. It is not clear whether this decision had been influenced by Kadin’s 
high profile and its recommendations. Kadin members argued that having a business 
person at the helm of Indonesia’s economic management would finally deliver results. In 
any case, it appears that many of Kadin’s recommendations were adopted by the SBY 
government. 
 
One of the first initiatives of the new government was to convene an Infrastructure 
Summit in January 2005 to attract the participation of the private sector, domestic but 
with an eye on foreign investors in particular, in the development of infrastructure. The 
result was disappointing as the government failed to deliver on many of the reforms and   11
regulations that would be necessary to improve the climate for infrastructure 
investment.
12 The decision in December 2004 by the Constitutional Court to annul the 
new Electricity Law that open up the industry was also a major set-back. Investors 
continued to adopt a wait and see attitude.  
 
In November 2005 the president undertook a mini reshuffle and replaced Aburizal Bakrie 
with an experienced and highly regarded technocrat, Boediono. As Minister of Finance 
under Megawati, Boediono was responsible for strengthening the country’s 
macroeconomic conditions by adopting relatively conservative policies for which he is 
well known. In his new position he soon found out that he needed to look beyond 
maintaining macroeconomic stability to tackle the urgent and more complicated issues of 
investment and employment. 
 
In February 2006, the government issued a policy reform package to improve the 
investment climate. This reform package “signaled an increased sense of urgency about 
the government’s reform agenda, and a new, more systematic approach to reform by 
Boediono ……. In contrast to the ‘deal making’ or ‘CEO’ approach taken by his 
predecessor…. .” 
13 It was a rather substantial package as it involves a total of 85 items 
for action. This included several major pieces of legislation, a new capital investment law 
and a new tax law, an amendment to customs and excise law and revisions to the 
manpower law. Following major demonstrations by labor unions, the government has put 
the revision of the manpower law on hold, but it has submitted the other draft laws to the 
parliament. The process is not likely to be a smooth one given political sensitivity of the 
issues, increased nationalistic sentiments (capital investment law), vested interests 
(taxation law), and maneuvering by political factions in the parliament with various 
political agendas. Several criticisms have been directed towards President SBY for not 
using his political capital and strong legitimacy (having 62% of the popular votes) in 
dealing with the parliament to ensure that reasonable compromises can be achieved with 
a reasonably short time (Wanandi, forthcoming). Pressures are building up as 
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unemployment continues to grow and incidence of poverty also increases. President 
SBY’s leadership is certainly not the only factor, but perhaps an important factor, in 
explaining why reforms continue to be slow.  
 
The following sections will review in greater detail the experiences of undertaking reform 
during the Megawati government and the challenges faced by the SBY government in 
undertaking further reforms that will largely have to deal with a host of microeconomic 
problems, in addition to legal reform and the fight against corruption. Disciplining policy 
may not be the main problem now, granted that Boediono, being at the helm of economic 
management, is fully backed by the president. The absence of IMF, which has played an 
important role in disciplining policy, will not be critical. What may be missing could be 
the strong drivers for the reform. Some international and regional commitments could 
help, but perhaps the major impediment to sustaining reform is weak implementation 
capacity and mechanisms to assure that policy decisions get acted on by the bureaucracy 
and other governmental agencies at the national and regional levels. 
 
 
2. Economic and policy reforms over the 2001 – 06 period: a review 
 
2.1 Megawati administration period
14 
To organise the review, this section divides the reforms into two groups: the IMF related 
and non-related reforms. The former includes the amendment of central bank Law (No. 
23/1999) and few reforms to meet the structural benchmark of the IMF-LOIs signed 
during the Megawati period. The latter includes few reforms undertaken either to 
improve the earlier administrations (i.e. Habibie’s and Abdurahman Wahid’s) and/or to 
achieve the objective of the White Paper. 
 
2.1.1 The IMF-related economic reforms 
There were nine IMF-LOIs signed by the government, including the one that marked the 
end of IMF program. The LOIs covered the following key areas: overall macroeconomic 
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policy objective; fiscal decentralization; banking restructuring; privatisation; legal 
reforms; and reforms in public and other important sectors in the economy. Unlike the 
earlier ones, in these LOIs the IMF seems to have changed its approach, from micro to 
broader macro policy guidelines (Siregar 2001). As reported in Athukorala (2002, p.142), 
the change was attributed both to the improving confidence of the Megawati’s 
administration and the ‘learning-by-doing of the IMF in dealing with the economic crisis 
in Indonesia.  
 
The performance of the government in delivering economic reforms to meet the structural 
objectives outlined in the LOIs had been mixed. On the one hand, the government, for 
example, was successful in having the central bank law amended and the state finance 
law passed. On the other, the government was not so successful in reforming the tax 
administration and privatisation.  
 
The amendment of the central bank law (No. 23/1999). 
The amendment of the central bank law in principle aimed at addressing the weaknesses 
of the law, which, as noted by Goeltom and Pangestu (2001) and McLeod (2003), 
including the following main issues: 
•  Unclear definition on the mechanism to achieve the central bank’s  (Bank of 
Indonesia’s – BI’s) single objective, namely stabilising the Rupiah exchange rate. 
This is the issue of BI’s policy instruments. In the law, the term ‘stability’ could be 
interpreted to mean either stability of the domestic price level, or stability of the 
exchange rate. In theory, it is clear that monetary policy cannot achieve both 
simultaneously. 
•  Confusing interpretation regarding the BI’s goal of independence. On the one hand, 
the law gives an authority to BI to determine the level of the objective (i.e., the target 
inflation rate each year), but on the other, the law also requires BI to take into account 
the likely impact of its monetary policy on the overall national economic performance 
in achieving its objective. 
•  The law is lacking an effective mechanism to monitor, or to account for, the 
performance of the BI’s senior managers.   14
 
After a long process in the parliament, the amendment of the law was finally passed by 
the parliament on 19 December 2003. While addressing the issue of BI’s independence, 
the amendment kept the provision on the BI’s instruments. Concerning the BI’s goal of 
independence, the amendment contains a clause that, in principle, reduces the extent of 
BI’s independence. In the amendment, the inflation target is to be determined by jointly 
by the government and BI. While this provision follows the modern model of central 
banks, as in Australia and New Zealand for example, to date it is not clear how it would 
play out. This, obviously, creates a room for conflict between BI and the government 
agency, most likely the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The amendment also established a 
supervisory board, comprising five members, to improve the accountability for the 




While the amendment (i.e., the reform) was successfully delivered, it is important here to 
note the difficult process in delivering the amendment. The amendment proposal was 
strongly scrutinised by the parliament, and at one point, the proposal reached about 400 
amendments (Goeltom and Pangestu 2001). The main reason for this difficult process, 
also being the main objection from the IMF, was the fact that these amendments could 
potentially undermine the autonomy of BI. The deadlock arising from the persistence of 
the two sides (i.e., the government-and-IMF and the parliament) led to the forming of a 
‘neutral’ panel of experts to provide some policy recommendations. While the exact 
recommendations were unknown, it seems that the points in the amendments outlined 
above were the key recommendations given by the panel.  
 
Reforming the public finance 
The reform to improve a sound system of public finance management and good 
governance was marked by the passing of the state finance law (No. 17/2003) in the early 
second half of 2003. The law had been in the parliament’s deliberation process for quite a 
long period of time, since it was one of the three public finance laws first proposed in 
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2000.  
 
The state finance law was an important milestone in the public finance reform. It was 
designed primarily to address the increasingly ineffective law governing the state finance 
management (Ginting 2003). For about sixty years since its independence, Indonesia had 
relied on the colonial-era legislation on government budgetary management. In addition 
to not putting accountability on government expenditure, the old law clearly was not able 
to cope with the changes in institutional and financial arrangements taking place since 
independence. This particularly concerned the new arrangements for regional autonomy 
initiated in early 2001.  
 
To ensure the accountability for public finance management, the state finance law puts 
great emphasis on the auditing process, which is now designed to be no longer a 
formality, and mechanisms to promote greater transparency in the state budgeting process 
(see Box 2). The state treasury law, aimed at providing the details for the implementation 
of state finance law, was also passed by the parliament a few months after the passing of 
the state finance law. In addition to these, the state finance law also ensures a mechanism 
to govern fiscal discipline, both at the level of central and regional government.  
 
As argued by Ginting (2003, p.356), the success of the state finance law depends on the 
capacity to implement the law effectively. This is because the law dramatically breaks the 
‘long-established’ system which had been followed by the government. In this respect, a 
successful implementation would require a bureaucratic reform that could change the 
quality of civil service. As is commonly known, the promotion of civil servants tends not 
to be based on performance. A successful implementation would also require an ability to 
transfer the power from the MOF, which under the old system played a significant role in 
determining the allocation of state funds, to the line of other ministries. While clear as a 
concept, implementing this in practice would not be easy, because – combined with the 
poor quality of civil service in general – it means the bureaucrats have to withdraw their 
power to impose informal taxes under the old system. Ensuring a smooth process in the 
power transfer therefore would also require a significant bureaucratic reform.   16







Box 2.  
The main articles of the state finance law (No. 17/2003).  
 
The primary objective of the law is to ensure that public finances are managed in 
efficient, effective, transparent and accountable manner. To ensure this, the law 
stipulates the following: 
•  All public funds must be managed in accordance to the law. To ensure this, the law 
provides a comprehensive definition of the role and scope of public finance. This 
instruction partly aims to eliminate the off-budget financing which is often 
regarded as one sources of corruption.  
•  The Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan – BPK) must audit every 
transaction related to state finance. As noted in the text, this shift the common 
practice that audit process would no longer a formality.  
•  Budget execution has to be done in clear and transparent manner. The law clarifies 
the allocation of the responsibility of state finance within the executive, that is, the 
finance minister plays a role of chief financial officer with the each line of minister 
plays a role of chief operation officer. The law requires an establishment of a more 
effective and transparent treasury management, which was governed by the state 
treasury law passed.  
•  Related to the earlier point, the law stipulates a clear budgetary process within the 
executive and legislative branches of the government, both at the national and 
regional level.  
•  The fiscal relationship between the central and regional government, central 
government and central bank, and regional  government and  foreign
government/financial institutions. The law leaves the authority for managing 
foreign grants and loans to central government, which can pass the funds to 
regional governments. In this context, the law also put discipline criteria to ensure 
fiscal sustainability, in which the law requires that the size of government deficit 
and the ratio of government debt to GDP may not exceed 3 and 60 per cent, 
respectively. This criterion applies to both central and regional government. 
•  The government to provide comprehensive information at all steps of budgetary 
process, including performance indicators for each budget item in addition to the 
financial information itself.  
 
Source: Ginting (2003, p.354-56).    17
Tax administrative reform  
Reforming tax administration was one of the structural reforms included in the LOIs. The 
reform has the main objective of increasing tax revenue collection through the 
implementation of some ambitious structural measures. The reform included measures to 
establish a special unit to pursue large taxpayers and to create a more efficient and 
effective tax system. To appreciate the ambition of these measures, it is important to put 
them in the context of the economic situation at that time. That is, the tax administration 
reforms, together with some other fiscal measures, were intended to increase the 
flexibility of fiscal policy in promoting economic recovery from the economic crisis. As 
noted by many economists, fiscal policy was very limited at that time due to the sharply 
rising public debt as a result of the crisis.  
 
The government established the Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) in early 2003. Despite the 
promising start and objective, which was to improve tax administration through faster 
processing with increased transparency, there was no significant progress or follow-up 
regarding the establishment of the office.  
 
The government also completed and submitted the draft for amendment of the general tax 
procedure law (No. 16/2000) in December 2003. The draft was quite controversial. 
Among other things, the draft gives the tax department full authority to investigate a tax 
crime without consultation with police and includes a provision for sizeable fines for 
lesser violations, such as late or failed submission (Kenward 2004). The draft received 
strong objection from businesses, with potentially larger scope for extortion and 
corruption by unscrupulous tax officials being the main point (Jakarta Post, 14/11/2003). 
As further argued by Kenward (2004, p.16), the draft was so dramatic in terms of change 
that it might not effectively be translated into large tax collections.  
 
The slow progress of privatisation  
Privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was another broad reform agenda 
induced by the IMF, which had been started two years earlier before the Megawati 
administration period. Notwithstanding its importance in promoting economic recovery,   18
the progress on privatisation had been very slow. This had been reported in various 
editions of BIES’ Survey of Recent Development in early 2000. 
 
Athukorala (2002, p.155) reported that one factor contributing to the slow progress was 
the government’s ambivalent attitude to the whole idea of privatisation. Several 
arguments underlying the attitude were put forward by some groups within the 
government. One group believed that privatisation was the way to achieve greater 
efficiency. Other groups, including nationalists, were concerned with the potential 
adverse effect on job losses from the privatisation and the potential ownership transfer 
from domestic to foreign entrepreneurs. The latter was clearly reflected in the strong 
objection to the government’s effort to sell the ownership of  PT Semen Gresik, to 
Mexican company Cemex.  
 
Perhaps reflecting a more serious objection towards the idea of privatisation, Athukorala 
also reported few reverse-privatisation actions by the government. In particular, the 
government had been buying back the shares of two giant telecommunication SOEs, i.e. 
PT Indosat and PT Telkom, from their foreign partners in the companies’ various 
subsidiaries.  
 
In addition to hampering the process of economic recovery, the anti-privatisation 
sentiment –combined with few other unfriendly polices – seems to have further damaged 
the prospect for economic recovery, by destroying international market confidence in the 
Indonesian economy.
16 Similar to the report on privatisation, various BIES editions of 
Survey of Recent Development in early 2000 reported a deteriorating foreign investment 
performance. The anti-privatisation sentiment, therefore, might be argued to have 
undermined the other positive results from the successful reforms.   
 
2.1.2 The non IMF-related economic reforms 
As noted earlier in the introduction and illustrated above, the Megawati administration 
                                                 
16 The other unfriendly policy was the rising protectionist trend after the crisis. This was also well-reported 
in the various editions of BIES as well as in Soesastro and Basri (2005).   19
was rather successful in building and maintaining macroeconomic stability. In contrast, 
the administration was rather unsuccessful in delivering the ‘micro’ reforms as stated in 
the White Paper. This is in particular in addressing the issue of deteriorating investment 
climate. Some observers, however, gave some credit to the administration in delivering 
reforms aiming at improving the implementation of the new regional arrangements after 
the crisis.  
 
The failure reform to improve investment climate: the case of labour policy 
Before describing what had happened during the Megawati period regarding labour 
policy, it is important to briefly describe the historical context of labour policy making 
after the crisis.  
 
The most important point to mention is there was a dramatic change in the labour market 
institutions immediately following the crisis, one aspect of which was a significant 
improvement in the freedom of labour to negotiate and organise (Hill 2006). This is 
clearly in contrast to the situation in the Soeharto era (i.e. before the crisis), where labour 
unions and industrial relation processes were tightly controlled by the government 
(Manning 1998).
17 But, as noted by Aswicahyono et al. (2004) and Hill (2006), the rising 
labour market populism seems to have been excessive, and as a result, several new rigid 
labour regulations were introduced immediately after the crisis. 
 
Two regulations in this regards are the controversial Ministrial Decree 150 passed in 
2000 and the rule concerning the determination of the minimum wage. For the former, 
the Decree set new rights concerning severance pay and compensation. The rights 
encourage workers to make excessive claims and to resort to strike when their demands 
are not met (Dick 2001, p. 28).
18 Thus in short, the Decree significantly increases the 
costs needed to be paid by firms if they are to release some workers. The latter was set as 
a part of the much bolder decentralisation program implemented in 2001. In particular, 
                                                 
17 Although it is important to note here the seriousness of the government in the 1990s in enforcing the 
ruling of minimum wage. According to Manning (1998, p. 228), it was a political strategy aimed at 
defusing the issue of union freedoms and labour rights by indicating that the government was capable of 
delivering real gains to workers, even in the absence of free trade unions.  
18 See, for example Dick (2001) and Alisjahbana and Manning (2005) for more detail on the Decree.    20
the rule shifts the power to set minimum wage from central to provincial governments. In 
setting the minimum wages, the heads of the regional governments also receive 
recommendations from tripartite councils in their regions (Suryahadi et al. 2003).
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In response to the complaints from business sector regarding the Decree, the government 
drafted a new labour law which, after a lengthy deliberation process in the parliament, 
was passed by the parliament on 25 February 2003. The law replaces more than ten older 
pieces of legislation, including the controversial Ministerial Decree No. 150/2000. It was 
intended to strike a balance between the long years of political repression on labour and 
the mounting concerns among investors that Indonesia was losing its competitiveness in 
labour-intensive manufacturing (MacIntyre and Resosudarmo 2003, p. 148). The law was 
also seen as a compromise between business, represented by the Indonesian Employers 
Association (Apindo), and a few big labour unions.  
 
While seen as a compromise, the law was still considered pro-labour, i.e., with 
employment conditions being costly and rigid from an employer’s perspective. Therefore, 
compared to the Ministerial Decree No. 150/2000, the law was still seen as anti-business 
(MacIntyre and Resosudarmo 2003). As described in Box 3, for example, the concession 
given to employers regarding the generous severance payment ruled in the Decree is 
small, and the right to be paid while striking remains, provided the strike occurs in the 
place of employment and is subject to advance notification.  
 
The failure of the Megawati administration to deliver the needed reforms could be 
attributed to the excessive swing towards the pro-labour side in regulation making 
(Aswicahyono et al. 2004). A clear reflection of this perhaps is the fact that the two 
manpower ministers during the era of Gus Dur and Megawati, respectively, came from 
labour unions group. Moreover, in a short period of time after the crisis, about 60-plus 
new labour unions emerged and there was a widespread belief among the unions that it is 
now (i.e. after the Soeharto era) the time for labour to turn to gain fairer share of the 
‘development pie’ (Alisjahbana and Manning 2002). 
                                                 
19 See, for example Alisjahbana and Manning (2005) for the detail of the rule.   21
 
 
The excessive swing implies an unbalanced representation between firms and unions at 
the policy-maker level. This can clearly be seen from the absence of flexibility in the 
post-crisis Indonesian labour market, which is quite in contrast to the labour market 
situation before the crisis. The literature on Indonesian economic development has 
recorded that flexibility is one of the important factors in supporting the export-oriented 
industrialisation in the 1990s (e.g. Manning 1998; Hill 1996). The flexibility evidently 
played a significant role for firms in surviving the crisis. Manning (2000) and World 
Bank (2000) consistently found evidence that firms ‘hoard labour’ in an attempt to 
minimise costs.  
 
Unsuccessful attempt to improve infrastructure: the case of Electricity Law
20 
Policy measures to improve the infrastructure were another set of policy priorities in the 
White Paper. The quality of infrastructure in Indonesia has deteriorated since the crisis. 
The lack of the country’s financing capacity was one of the reasons for the poor 
                                                 
20 This sub-section draws from Soesastro and Atje (2005). 
Box 3 
Some key elements of labour law No. 13/2003. 
 
•  It accepts the generous rate of severance and long service pay set out in Ministerial 
Decree No. 150/2002, with minor concession to employers, such as the maximum 
severance pay of 9 rather 12 months time a worker’s monthly salary. However, 
employers are not (any longer) required to provide severance pay to workers that 
resign voluntarily.  
•  The right to be paid while striking remains, provided the strike occurs at the place 
of employment an both employers and the authorities are given advance 
notification. If the strikes violate the procedures, the strikes are considered illegal 
and without pay, and workers are liable to temporary lockout. 
•  The law places stricter limits on the use of labour for outsourcing or temporary 
labour for core activities. 
•  Minimum wages are set by the provincial governors, not the head of districts, 
based on a ‘fitting’ standard living. 
 
Source: MacIntyre and Resosudarmo (2003, p.148-9).     22
infrastructure quality (World Bank 2005).
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The Megawati administration took some policy actions attempting to solve the financing 
problem. In the energy sector, this is shown by the introduction of the new Electricity 
Law (No. 20/2002) and Oil and Gas Law (No. 22/2001). These laws encouraged the 
participation of private firms in both sectors, by unbundling the business activities in the 
sectors which ideally should attract new players in the industries.  
 
While promising, the introduction of the laws had not been so successful. The Electricity 
Law was annulled by Constitutional Court in 2003, based on the complaint from the 
labour union of Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the state company which has been the 
sole provider of electricity, and a number of NGOs. These parties opposed the 
unbundling proposal, which was aimed at increasing efficiency, and argued that the 
unbundled system (i.e. electricity generation, transmission and distribution) would result 
in higher prices for consumers than those under the PLN’s vertically integrated operation. 
They further argued that the opening up of the distribution activities would violate the 
spirit of Article 33 of the National Constitution.  
 
With the annulment, the previous electricity law came back into force (i.e. No. 15/1985) 
which, in principle, does not allow any private participation. In other words, PLN was 
still the sole operator in the electricity sector. This, obviously, was an anti-reform result, 
since the efficiency goal – implied by the unbundling – was not achieved. In addition – 
and perhaps is more importantly – the annulment washed out the positive reform 
momentum to reform institutions. This is because the new law also included a proposal 
for an independent regulatory body, i.e. the Electricity Market Supervisory Board, which 
was designed to review all regulations affecting the electricity sector.  
 
While it might not be important, it is worth mentioning that the Constitutional Court was 
a new institution established after the crisis. The Court has the same legal position as the 
                                                 
21 The other important reason is the coordination problem with the regional governments, due to regional 
autonomy. In particular, there are overlaps between the various government institutions (i.e. between the 
central and the regional governments) in the provision of infrastructure.    23
parliament and was established to provide a kind of ‘check-and-balance’ mechanism for 
the laws produced by the parliament.  
 
Similar to the Electricity Law, the Oil and Gas Law also received challenges from the 
Constitutional Court. The Oil and Gas Law in principle introduced the same proposal as 
in the Electricity Law. A complaint was made by the labour union of  Pertamina, the 
state-owned monopolist, for job security reasons. However, unlike the Electricity Law, 
the Oil and Gas Law was not annulled. The Court merely recommended that certain 
articles to be modified. One reason for the different outcome is that the Court seemed to 
have realised the importance of a supervisory board, which was also established in the 
Law.  
 
The experience described above illustrates the importance of strong and capable 
institutions to ensure a credible policy reform. The failure in passing the Electricity Law 
was unlikely to have come from the content of the law. In fact, the law sent a very strong 
signal for reform, owing to the promotion of higher participation of private sector and an 
establishment of an independent regulatory body in for the sector. What we can learn 
from this particular experience perhaps is the importance of capacity building needed by 
new institutions. As described, although the aim of both laws is in principle the same, the 
end result is different between the two. This suggests the lack of understanding by the 
Constitutional Court in the policy idea proposed in the laws. While this might be true, the 
difference might also be because the Court had not had enough experience in handling 
their task. As noted, the Court was a new institution at the time when both laws were 
reviewed.   
 
It is important to note here, however, that the strong opposition from the bureaucrats and 
workers in the PLN might be another important factor contributing to the unsuccessful 
reform. Thus, similar to the case of slow progress in the IMF-induced privatisation 
program described earlier, it can be concluded that economic reforms involving wide 
public or nationalistic interest are still difficult to achieve.  
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The reforms to improve regional autonomy 
Another major policy reform done in the Megawati administration was the introduction 
of two new laws governing regional autonomy, the law No. 32/2004 and No. 33/2004, 
which replaced the old laws of No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999, respectively.  
 
According to Brodjonegoro (2005), the most important breakthrough in the new law that 
governed the economic decentralisation (i.e. law No. 33/2004) is the elimination of the 
so-called ‘no-harm’ clause. Based on the three-year implementation of the regional 
autonomy program, the clause evidently failed to reduce the fiscal imbalance between 
regions. In short, the elimination of the clause ensures that the worse-off region would 
have enough funds to finance their basic public expenditure, while the well-off regions 
(i.e., those with abundant natural resources) would not be given additional assistance 
from the central government to finance their public expenditure.  
 
Related to this, the new law also improves the rule for determining the size of the ‘fiscal 
gap’, which is the gap that determines the intergovernmental transfer (i.e., from central to 
regional government) and hence the size of fiscal imbalance. Most important in this 
respect is the inclusion of more rigorous determining variables, such as Regional GDP 
and Human Development Index (HDI), to replace the poverty variable used in 
accordance with the old law (i.e. the law No25/1999).  
 
Despite this major improvement, the new law did not really address the issue of 
incomplete fiscal decentralisation. According to some researchers, the old 
decentralisation law only intensified decentralisation in the expenditure side of the local 
government budget, and not in the revenue side. Local governments still do not have 
authority to impose significant taxes, such as income and property taxes, which 
potentially could reduce the dependency of local on central government.   
 
While there was a rather successful reform of the economic aspects of decentralization, 
via law No. 33, there was a rather unclear message delivered from a political perspective, 
via law No. 32. According to few observers, the law is seen as an attempt by the   25
government to regain some of the authority and functions that had been devolved to local 
governments by the old decentralization laws (Soesastro and Atje 2005). This is 
illustrated, for example, by some articles in the law that enhance the role and authority of 
governors vis-à-vis the heads of local government (districts/municipalities).  
 
2.2 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration period 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was installed as the nation’s sixth president on 20 October 
2004. He assumed power under a favourable environment, at least in the short term. On 
the international economic front, global economic growth in 2004 was predicted to be the 
highest in 30 years. International energy prices were at record levels, while interest rates 
remained historically low. On the domestic political economy front, it seemed that SBY 
could face serious obstacles in getting his reforms through parliament since his 
Democratic Party had very small direct representation in the parliament — fewer than 
10% of the members. However, unlike the the three previous administrations, the new 
president has been granted a strong democratic mandate through a fair and transparent 
electoral process. Moreover, SBY incurred few political debts. All of these can be seen as 
an unparalleled opportunity for SBY to bring the country to high growth. 
 
However, although the opportunities are immense, the challenges are also daunting. 
Megawati’s administration was able to restore macroeconomic stability, but 
microeconomic performance was dismal. Recorded foreign direct investment (FDI) 
continued to be negative in the first half of 2004. Indonesia is the only crisis-affected 
economy in Asia in which investors — foreign and, more importantly, local — are still 
essentially holding back. They wait for clear signals that this is a government with the 
determination and capacity to deliver a predictable, growth-oriented policy environment. 
 
Substantial political and economic changes in recent years have implications for how the 
institutional arrangements that underpinned past liberalization might operate in the future. 
There are three broad changes since the fall of Soeharto. First, greater authority has 
shifted from the President to Parliament. Second, key economic ministers are less 
connected by shared views and constituencies. Third, decentralization has shifted much   26
responsibility to the regions. As a result, policy decision-making has become fragmented, 
with each ministry or local government operating according to its own agenda and 
without a common vision.  
 
There were several economic policies that will be used by the public as a yardstick to 
evaluate the likely performance of the new administration. First, the likelihood of success 
will be judged on the basis of the composition of the new cabinet, especially the finance, 
coordinating economics, trade, industry, state enterprises, attorney general and labour 
portfolios. Second, the public will evaluate major statements on broad development 
objectives. Third, the public anticipated quick-acting reforms to demonstrate to the 
business community the government’s serious intent. Fourth, the public will judge 
whether the medium-term development plan is coherent and addressed the key issues, 
such as the deteriorating quality of physical infrastructure, partial labour market 
deregulation, targeted social programs, sweeping administrative simplification, and 
clarity in centre–region relations. 
 
The composition of the cabinet has been rather disappointing. The Coordinating Minister 
for Economic Affairs, Aburizal Bakrie, is well known for the privileged position during 
and beyond the Soeharto era. The Minister of Finance, Jusuf Anwar, is an experienced 
bureaucrat but may not have political skills to make much headway in this most difficult 
portfolio. Two most capable ministers Sri Mulyani Indrawati and Mari Pangestu hold 
relatively less important planning and trade portfolios. It is surprising that SBY did not 
capitalize on his strong democratic mandate to form a “professional cabinet”. Instead, he 
assemble a compromise cabinet (also called kabinet pelangi -  rainbow cabinet) in order 
to gain support from major parties and to accommodate the various regional and ethnic 
demands for ministerial representation. 
 
To respond to the public expectation that the government will move quickly, SBY 
instructed his ministers to formulate 100 day programs. The agenda focuses on three 
objectives: to improve investment climate, to maintain macroeconomic stability, and to 
raise public welfare and eradicate poverty. These three broad objectives were translated   27
into various goals to be achieved through various programs and actions. Through these 
agendas the government wants to give a clear signal on the importance of improving the 
investment climate. However, the detail of the programs was not made public and 
became an internal working document. 
 
Unfortunately, the implementation of the program did not reflect the government 
willingness and ability to deliver it promises. First, there were no clear signals that the 
government has strong determination to act consistently and to implement a necessary but 
unpopular policy. For example, the decision to put off the proper resolution of the long 
running Cemex-Semen Gresik dispute, clearly shows the business community, that the 
government willingness and ability to improve investment climate is limited. Second, the 
fact that the detail of the programs was not made public prevents the public from 
knowing about the direction of the country’s development for the next five years. 
Moreover, performance cannot be objectively evaluated by outsiders. 
 
Infrastructure Challenges 
As a result of economic crisis, infrastructure has been deteriorating rapidly. Box 4 
provides the World Bank’s estimate on the magnitude of infrastructure problems. World 
Bank also suggested three main explanations for Indonesia’s poor infrastructure. First, 
the economic crisis of 1997–98 dramatically reduced the country’s financial capacity to 
maintain infrastructure and make new investments in it. The Bank estimated, for 
example, that only 3% of GDP was allocated for infrastructure maintenance and 
development in 2002, down sharply from 7% in 1996. Second, even before the crisis, 
infrastructure development was held back by poor institutional and regulatory 
frameworks, and by corruption. Third, local governments have been given control of 
infrastructure under regional autonomy, but they are not being provided with adequate 
funds for infrastructure development; in addition, there are overlaps between the various 
levels of government in the provision of infrastructure. 
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Clearly, the investment needed to tackle such a huge problem is enormous, ranging from 
5% of GDP ($70 billion) to 10% of GDP. The government estimated that only 33% of the 
necessary total expenditure could be financed domestically. The remaining 67% should 
be financed by either/or multilateral/bilateral donors or foreign private investors. It is 
estimated that only 7% of the needs could be financed by ODA. The remaining gaps, 




Water and Sanitation 
•  Water access is low-22% of the population does not have access to ‘improved’ 
water, and only 14% are connected to municipal water supplies. 
•  Sanitation services are lacking-only 1.3% of the population are reached by 
sewerage networks. 
•  Municipal water companies (PDAM’s) are struggling-over two-thirds are loss-
making; water unaccounted for is over 40%; and tariffs are well below cost. 
 
Telecommunictions 
•  Fixed line access is the lowest in the region-covering only 4% of the population  
•  Massive investment is needed, but finding is a challenge-raising teledensity by just 
1% will cost $330 million. 
 
Power 
•  Access is low-currently, 43 % of the population is without power (roughly 90 
million people, including many of the poorest). 
•  Investment needs are high- an estimated $ 15-17 billion is needed before 2012 to 
provide an additional 9,700 megawatts of generation capacity, plus expanded 
transmission and distribution for 1.6 million connection annually. 
 
Roads and Road Transport 
•  Spending has declined- from 22 % of the national development budget in 1993 to 
11 % in 2000. 
•  Maintenance is lacking- the proportion of the road budget allocated for 
maintenance fell from 30 % in 1985 to below 10 % in 2000. 
•  Congestion is a problem- significant capacity expansion is needed, but little has 
been added, and urbanization trends will only worsen the problem (as suggested by 
rapid growth in the number of vehicles on the roads). 
 
Source: World Bank (2005), taken from Soesastro and Atje (2005).   29
 
Therefore, the success of the government in tackling the huge infrastructure problems 
hinges on the ability of government to attract domestic and foreign private investors to 
invest in infrastructure. This in turn requires a clearer overall strategy and greater 
certainty in relation to the regulatory framework. In the previous section, it was noted that 
Megawati’s government enacted various regulatory frameworks: a new 
telecommunication law in 1999, a new oil and gas law in 2001, a new electricity law in 
2002. 
 
However, these regulatory reforms were not fully effective for several reasons. First, 
there are either no clear objectives, or there are multiple objectives with no specification 
of what are the main and secondary objective. In the case of telecommunication law, for 
example, the objective is to introduce competition. But there are also other objectives 
such as to attract private investment, and to privatise the state-owned telecommunication 
company for state budget purposes. It is believed that the government reluctance to 
introduce full competition is based on the belief that monopoly profits for the telecom 
company are necessary to make the company attractive for the prospective buyer(s). 
 
Second, the implementing regulation, the complementary regulation, and the institutions 
to carry out the reform are not there, long delayed, or not carefully designed. As a result, 
the reforms become ineffective or create uncertainties. For example, one of the 
bottlenecks for toll road investment is the difficulty and the high cost of land clearing. 
Yet the draft regulation on land clearing attracted negative comment, based on the fear 
that the regulation may be misused to acquire land cheaply for the benefit of powerful 
interests. After long delay, finally the regulation was passed in May 2005. The regulation 
stipulates that land may be compulsorily acquired by governments for a variety of 
development purposes if an acceptable price cannot be agreed upon by negotiation. 
 
Third, reform is undermined by actions of different institutions that have different 
ideological views, and vested interests such as the incumbent SOE monopoly, or local 
governments. The example for this is the cancellation of the electricity law (No. 20/2002)   30
as reviewed earlier. 
 
Finally, there is also a problem of infrastructure pricing policies. McLeod ( ) points out 
that the private sector will not be interested in providing these kinds of infrastructure 
services unless it can be confident that its revenues will exceed its costs. Therefore, it 
requires that the government implement a “user pays” principle. However, investors have 
learned from the past that the government faces political difficulties every time it wishes 
to raise infrastructure sector prices under its control. 
 
Despite the regulatory weaknesses, there are several attempts to attract infrastructure 
investment.  The government held an infrastructure summit in Jakarta on 17-18 January 
2005. At the summit, the government offered 91 infrastructure projects to the private 
sector, involving a total investment estimated at $22.5 billion. Tenders were to be opened 
for bidding in the first week of March 2005 but, as of the middle of February, out of 91 
projects only nine projects had been declared ready for tendering. The government is 
being excessively optimistic—indeed, it seems to have been carried away by this new 
enthusiasm for private sector involvement in infrastructure—in planning for a second 
batch of over 40 even larger projects, with an estimated investment value of $57.5 billion 
in aggregate, to be offered in November 2005. Only the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and Japan expressed an interest in investing considerable sums in 
infrastructure at the summit. There is also the question of absorptive capacity, since 
Indonesia’s ability to absorb project assistance has been low and declining during the past 
few years.  
 
Policy Package for improvement of the investment climate 
The long awaited “Policy Package For Improvement of the Investment Climate” was 
announced on 2 March 2006. The package contains 85 regulatory and institutional 
reforms that the GOI plans to take in 2006 to improve the investment climate. It focuses 
on five areas: General investment policies; Customs, excise and duties policies; Taxation; 
Labour; and Small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
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Salient features in the package include submitting a revised investment law to Parliament 
by March 2006, and submitting revisions to the Manpower Law (No. 12/2003) to 
Parliament by the end of April 2006. The revised law would address business community 
concerns about worker severance costs, outsourcing and expatriate work permits.  
 
It is expected that the government and the parliament will reach a decision on the status 
of three draft tax laws now before parliament by the end of April 2006. The reform also 
mentions the revitalization of the “National Team for the Enhancement of Exports and 
Investment” (PEPI) to better coordinate investment policies and help solve high profile 
investment disputes "quickly, cheaply and fairly". 
 
The Ministry of Finance will accelerate customs processing times by June 2006 to 30 
minutes for green lane shipments and three days for red lane shipments, and a reduction 
of the use of the red lane to just 10 percent of shipments by December 2006. The 
Ministry of Finance will establish tax facilities for certain business sectors by the end of 
June 2006, and revise rules and regulations on value added taxes (VAT) to coincide with 
passage of a package of amended tax laws.  
 
The investment package also plans to simplify licensing in commerce by March 2006. 
According to the package, the licensing regulations to be simplified include: Trade 
Business License (SIUP), Trade Company Representation License (P3A), Surveyor 
Business Activity License (SIKUS), Modern Market Business License, Franchise 
Business Registration Document (STPUW), Agency and Distributor Registration 
Document, Alcoholic Beverages Trade Business License (SIUP-MB), Multi level sales 
business license (IUPB), and Warehouse Registration Document (TDG). To meet the 
investment package requirements, the MOT issued decrees on 4 April 2006. The decrees 
simplify application procedures and eliminate some bureaucratic requirements for those 
licenses. However, probably due to the sensitivity of the issue, the Modern Market 
Business License has not been reformed. 
 
Manpower Law   32
For several years the business community has expressed their grievance regarding 
Indonesia’s rigid labour law. World Bank’s “Doing Business Report” indicates that 
Indonesia’s labour market is among the most rigid in the region. The concern includes 
high worker severance costs, difficulty to outsource and hire contract workers and 
difficulty in obtaining expatriate work permits. The investment package address these 
issues and stipulates that the revision to Manpower Law (No. 13/2003) has to be 
submitted to Parliament by the end of April 2006. However, the resistance to the revision 
is very strong, and demonstrations and strikes escalated prior to the submission of the 
draft law to the parliament. The government succumbed to the pressure and dropped its 
plan to submit the revised version of the manpower law to parliament and will formulate 
another bill through the tripartite (government, businessmen and workers) forum. To give 
a sense of objectivity and to design a better system and law on manpower, the President 
also plans to initiate a study involving at least five higher learning institutes. 
 
Investment Law 
A new draft investment law has been submitted by the Minister of Trade to Parliament on 
March 22. If the draft passes the Parliament, the currently separate laws for foreign and 
domestic investors would be unified. The draft also provides traditional investment 
protections including national treatment, the right to repatriation of profits, and a 
guarantee against nationalization.  
 
The law will also shift the emphasis of the current approval system to a registration 
system. However, the shift would mean the removal of the right of the current 
Coordinating Board on Investment (BKPM) to grant approval. Initially, it was planned 
that the BKPM will be given a new role as a promotion agency. It is to be expected that 
the final result will be a compromise in which BKPM will still retain some right to grant 
approval. Another complication with the new investment law is that it should 
accommodate the new decentralised system in which a majority of central government 
responsibilities has been transferred to local governments.  
 
Accompanying the new Investment Law, the government of Indonesia also plans a   33
number of other regulatory reforms including a clearer, simpler, and more transparent 
criteria for the negative investment list. It is important to note that the draft regulation on 
the negative investment list for the first time requires some sort of regulatory impact 
assessment in choosing which sectors or activities should be included in the negative list. 
 
Another regulatory reform that will accompany the new Investment Law is the 
investment procedure regulation. The regulation contains a more streamlined and 
transparent investment procedure. The registration approach is also manifest in this 
regulation. It is expected that the new procedure will reduce the number of days needed 
to establish a business from 150 days to 30 days, and will give more certainty and 
transparency for the business community. 
 
The third regulation would provide a system of one-stop service for investors. This 
regulation, together with the revisions to Government Regulation 25 on the 
responsibilities of local governments in the area of investment, is expected to clear the 
confusion regarding the role of central government vis-à-vis local government in the area 
of investment. 
 
Six months has elapsed since the announcement of the investment package. There are 
fourteen policies that have not yet been implemented, and question about the 
effectiveness of the policies that have been implemented. The slow progress in the 
implementation of the investment package is the result of lack of capacity and 
coordination between departments, and the slow progress in the parliament. The chronic 
coordination problems seem to surface every time a new package is announced, reducing 
the effectiveness of the reforms. 
 
3. Summary and few lessons learnt 
The previous section has reviewed the experiences of undertaking economic reforms 
during the Megawati and SBY period. To briefly summarise, it appears the Megawati 
administration was quite successful in maintaining and improving the macroeconomic 
stability. The administration, however, seemed less successful in undertaking   34
microeconomic reform. As noted, the investment climate in the country deteriorated 
during the Megawati period. A task to improve investment climate has been the legacy of 
the Megawati administration, and became the main policy agenda of the SBY 
administration. As reviewed, the SBY administration has proposed several bold and quite 
ambitious policy reform initiatives to restore the investment climate. While promising, 
the implementation of the initiatives evidently has not been so effective and successful.  
 
Having reviewed the reforms, we attempted here to draw some important points on the 
factors that determine the success of undertaking reforms in Indonesia after the crisis.  
 
First, the role of IMF is very important in paving the way to deliver a successful reform 
and ensuring that the reform is appropriate and meets its objective. The amendment of the 
central bank law and the passing of the state finance law were two bold examples in this 
respect during the Megawati period. As noted, the Megawati period was quite successful 
in maintaining macroeconomic stability, which to large extent could be attributed to the 
result of the central bank law. 
 
Second, undertaking reforms tends to be quite difficult when it involves strong public or 
nationalistic interest. The experience of the privatisation reform agenda and nullification 
of the electricity law, as well as the relatively long period of deliberation of draft laws in 
the parliament, clearly illustrate this point. Related to this, MacIntyre and Resosudarmo 
(2003) noted that the long process of law deliberation in the parliament reflects the 
fundamental change in the Indonesian political architecture immediately after the crisis, 
where there had been a significant power shift from president to the parliament. The 
implication is that, as often the case, the days of quick and decisive action on major 
policy reforms no longer applies in the post-Soeharto era (MacIntyre and Resosudarmo 
2003, p. 153). There would not be significant reforms unless an agreement between the 
government and the parliament is reached.      
 
Third, in many cases, unsuccessful reforms might be caused by the absence of supporting 
institutions to carry out the reforms or the other complementary reforms. As a result of   35
the absence, reforms often become ineffective and are surrounded by many uncertainties. 
The absence of draft regulation on land clearing, which hampers the momentum to 
improve infrastructure (i.e. toll roads), illustrates this point.  
 
Fourth, reforms are often challenged by coordination problem. As noted, one explanation 
for the slow policy implementation and ineffectiveness of reforms is the fact that policy 
decision-making has become more fragmented after the Soeharto era.   36
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